


Global Outlook: Soft landing, hard landing, no landing?

Is the cup half empty, or the glass half full?


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Can the global economy find a landing zone?

- Pre-Covid investors were increasingly wary of a period of 'secular stagnation'. The definition of this is a period of prolonged low growth, low rates, and high unemployment.
 - Such a scenario is often associated with ineffective monetary policy and weak demand. Currently, we appear to be facing only the first criteria.
- Post-Covid investor worries centered around inflation. Supply shocks, re-opening dynamics, and energy price spikes, the combination of which prompted fears of a re-run of the 1970's.





Can the global economy find a landing zone? (2)

• Spiking prices resulted in policymakers playing catch-up through 2022, in part due to policy adjustment being delayed.....

.....hindsight is a wonderful thing.....


- Central bank complacency was evident during 2021. The Fed led the way in terms of attempting to explain away supply-side inflationary pressures as being merely 'transitory'.
 - What is transitory in central bank terms?
- Markets are attempting to determine whether the global economy can find that smooth landing zone.






Past disinflations came with heavy economic pain – Policy makers want to avoid repeating past mistakes





Source: BLS, CIBC

Inflation parallels from history – are we set for a re-run?




Consumer Price Index year-over-year percent change

- The above chart was recently published by former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers. In simple terms, the comparison looks compelling, not least as the recent uptick in oil price risks re-energizing headline price pressures.
- The similarities between past cycles and the current one relate to the impact of oil prices. The post-Ukraine invasion oil price spike is reminiscent of price reactions witnessed across the 1970s amidst regional conflicts and the Iranian Revolution.



Inflation parallels from history – are set for a re-run? (2)




Consumer Price Index year-over-year percent change

- The post-Covid period has been characterized by a number of specific criteria. Global macro re-opening, coincided with supply shortages, notably in key sectors such as computer chips, resulting in a material price squeeze.
- Should the extension in oil output reductions be seen through the prism of defensive efforts to sustain valuations or to drive prices higher, at the risk of compromising global growth? We would expect the former. The moderation in Chinese demand should help surely preclude fears of the return of US\$100p/b oil.



Inflation variables – supply concerns re-emerging?

Global Supply Chain Pressure Index



- After a material price spike, as we worked through the initial phase of Covid, we have witnessed broad supplyrelated price pressures falling back into negative territory.
- · Geopolitical factors remain the main influence on supply-side price concerns.
- The correction in the NY Fed global supply index, the series dipped below zero for the first time since Aug 2019, indicated a moderation in supply chain price pressures.
- Beyond global good prices we can expect increasing scrutiny of second round price effects. Global central banks are increasingly focused on service-related price dynamics, notably wage growth.



Labour force dynamics

Change in Labour Force (% vs Q4 2019) % Change in labour force (latest vs Q4 2019) 5 4 З 2 1 Ο -1 ΕZ UΚ US NZ Japan Canada Australia

Source: Statistics Canada, CIBC

- Increases in the size of labour force have benefitted the 'New World' Dollar Bloc.
- The lack of Japanese migration flows and the impact of Brexit, impacting EU workers, has resulted in the UK and Japan witnessing labour force challenges. Limited labour supply risks increased and more protracted wage pressures in regions/countries where supply remains constrained.
- Such considerations point towards potentially profound implications for Japanese policy normalization.



Central banks have repeated cycles last practiced in the '80's

- The scale of global policy tightening, allied to increasingly long and variable policy lags, demonstrates the policy difficulties faced by global central banks.
- Friedman created the metaphor of the "fool in the shower."

- The fool tinkers with the policy controls while failing to realize the lag between adjusting the temperature and the impact of the change.

• The metaphor suggests policymakers are prone to overshooting.

- This applies both on the way up and in terms of keeping rates too low for too long, as per post-2008 and the end of the DOT.com bubble. "The Fool in the shower"



A return to the '70's?- Bursting inflation or the economy

- Virtually all the major global central banks, bar the BoJ, have attempted to front-load policy tightening.
 - The list includes those who insisted their situations were different and didn't initially warrant immediate action such as the RBA and the Riksbank. Of course, both have been forced to materially adjust course.
- The Fed moved relatively expeditiously. The Fed continues to attempt to engineer a soft rather than a hard landing, is that still possible or feasible? We suspect that we have reached peak Fed hawkishness. We favour a soft landing. Recession risks are overstated.

- However, should we really expect Fed easing before the end of Q1 2024? We remain mindful of the post-SVB tightening in financial conditions. That tightening, post the SVB debacle, has fully unwound, have sectoral pressures truly passed?

• Does the inverted yield curve guarantee a recession?


- Back in early 2020, prior to the virus, we viewed the flattening of the US yield curve as a false flag and did not signal an imminent recession.

• Growth will continue to decelerate through this year and remain subpar into 2024. Global growth looks set to remain well below the 3% threshold through 2025. This level marks the effective tipping point for global living standards to be improving or deteriorating.

• Are demographics causing investors to increase rather than decrease saving?

US Curve and Recession Risks

US Curve and Recession Bands



- Does the yield curve inversion signal imminent recession? Currently, the market is assuming a 60% probability of a US recession, versus around 65% three months ago. The Cleveland Fed's yield curve model peaked at 79% in April, this marked the highest reading since 1982.
- We would view such assumptions as too high. That being said the US economy risks moderating towards the stall speed. Nevertheless, we do not expect rates to be cut quickly.
- Can the Fed engineer a slowdown without risking a material unemployment spike? Larry Summers has suggested that the Fed needs an unemployment spike. We do not anticipate needing to see the u/e rate spiking toward 5%, we assume a peak below 4.5%.

- Back in early 2020, we viewed the flattening of the US yield curve as a false flag. Previous oil price spikes in the last decade did not result in a recession. The rationale comes via the fact that oil is less important within the consumer/industrial spectrum than in earlier decades.

Recession or weak GDP across most of the globe in 2023/24

	2019A	2020A	2021A	2022A	2023F	2024F	2025F
World*	2.8	-2.8	6.3	3.5	2.6	2.3	2.8
US	2.3	-2.8	5.9	2.1	2.0	0.8	1.6
Canada	1.9	-5.1	5.0	3.4	1.2	0.7	2.1
Eurozone	1.6	-6.3	5.6	3.4	0.5	0.2	1.0
UK	1.6	-10.4	8.7	4.3	0.4	0.1	1.2
Australia	1.9	-1.8	5.2	3.7	1.8	1.0	1.8
Japan	-0.4	-4.3	2.3	1.0	1.9	1.0	1.2
China	6.0	2.2	8.4	3.0	4.8	4.2	4.4
* At Purchasing power parity							


GDP – still sub-par into 2025

Source: CIBC Economics/FICC Strategy

- Global GDP peaked back in '17. The Covid downdraft proved more aggressive in the US than the slide post the GFC, US GDP merely declined by 2.6% in 2009.
- Global activity is set to remain below-trend levels in most instances in 2024. The question is whether the scale of policy tightening, risks triggering a material recession.
- The Eurozone remains exposed to external events including weak Chinese demand and Ukraine-related concerns. Europe needs another benign winter in order to preclude fresh energy price concerns. Fears of the real economy being impacted by gas supply restrictions have materially eased, for now.
- China's growth challenges were initially amplified by the zero Covid strategy. Post the strategy reversal we are now in a scenario where consumer confidence and or spending remains fragile, underlining ongoing growth challenges. Even the new moderate growth target seems increasingly out of reach.



China: growth trends still matter



China nominal trade remains elevated

China GDP a new paradigm

- The key question for the Chinese authorities is can they create a smooth landing most notably in terms of real estate. We would expect policy to remain easy in order to ease pressures in the sector.
- Despite the moderation in global growth the nominal trade surplus has continued to broadly advance. Such a scenario has important implications in the FX space.
- The ending of the zero Covid strategy has potentially profound implications. The rebound in domestic demand will see an increasing degree of growth proving to be domestically generated.



What could go wrong?..... Still quite a lot, actually.....

- Excessive rate hikes by central banks. Should US terminal rates push higher (oil price pressures remain an existential risk) expect global recession risks to extend. We've seen that movie.
 - Does the Fed risk a policy mistake? Is the Fed alone in such risks?
 - Have the central banks understood the impact/implications of broad credit tightening?
- The market is not priced for a material escalation in events in Ukraine.
- Financial markets and wealth effects. Extending policy tightening risks undermining consumer confidence and spending.
- Political risks remain real as we move towards a 2024 election cycle.
- Demographics ageing populations and changing spending habits are set to materially impact the investment landscape



Summing up: a cup half empty, or the glass half full?




- We have had tailwinds in terms of getting headline inflation down, namely base effects, at least into H2 2023.
- But we still need a stall in growth and higher jobless rates to sustainably reach 2% CPI.
- High inflation remains the number one tail risk.
- Central banks are nearly done with hikes. The lagged impacts of prior hikes are set to kick in.
- In order to avoid the mistakes of the past rates will have to stay high for a period. Those hoping for early easing are set to be disappointed.
- Equities will benefit from assumptions of lower rates into H2 2024 alongside a lower inflation trajectory.
- Stronger growth prospects and an easing bias favours the high beta currencies into H2 next year.



Global FX Reserves – USD Hegemony

Global FX Diversification- Too early to call the demise of the USD



- At the turn of the century USD holdings accounted for more than 70% of allocated global FX reserves, this compares with just 59% at the end of Q1 2023 according to the latest IMF data.
- EUR holdings peaked ahead of the euro crisis near 28% in '09. Negative EUR rates saw holdings slip below 20%. Although holdings rebounded to 20.5% at the end of 2022 holdings moderated in Q1 to 19.77%. Positive rates have yet to materially impact reserve managers.
- That EUR reserves remain only around a third of those of the USD Dollar underlines that the Dollar's "exorbitant privilege" of being the international reserve currency looks set to remain in place.
- The proportion held in CNH has effectively doubled since the start of 2018. Chinese FX reserve holdings equate to around USD289bn or more accurately just over 2.5% of total allocated global reserves. A lack of convertibility suggests we are unlikely to witness a substantive increase in CNY reserves.



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